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ance Co.,28 nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed
the decision of the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit 24 which
had rejected the application of the lex loci delicti rule to allow a
Louisiana domiciliary recovery against another Louisiana domiciliary for injuries suffered while a guest in the former's automobile and driving in Arkansas on their way from Louisiana to
Iowa. The supreme court's majority opinion, to which Justice
Sanders dissented, gives sufficient references to the changing
thought on the subject; but its stated reasons for continuing to
apply the rule of lex loci delicti, in spite of their length and argumentative tone, appear to the writer to evidence less concern
with a reasonable delineation of legislative jurisdiction-or applying the law applicable to the regulation of the rights and
obligations of the parties-than they do with mere judicial convenience.20 There can be no doubt that a conflicts rule having the
force of custom on a national scale should not be discarded lightly; but once any custom has been shown to be unreasonable it
becomes necessary to reject it in favor of a more reasonable
regulation. The position taken by the Restatement of Conflict
of Laws (Second), Proposed Official Draft is that conflict of
laws rules based on decisions are subject to re-evaluation and
change,2 and in the particular matter of guest passenger liability
the Restatement Draft, as noted by the supreme court, leans toward the rejection of the application of the lex loci delicti.27 The

supreme court should reconsider the Johnson decision at its first
opportunity.
CRIMINAL LAW
Dale E. Bennett*
Aggravated Arson-Danger to Firemen
Foreseeable danger to human life is an essential and distinguishing element of aggravated arson. 1 Thus, within the Louisiana Criminal Code definition, the burning during business
23. 256 La. 289, 236 So.2d 216 (1970).
24. 218 So.2d 375 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
25. The supreme court rebuked the court of appeal for failing to follow
its previous decisions on the matter. See the author's and Assistant Pro
fessor Tate's discussion of this facet of the decision at p. 185 supra.
26, RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (SECOND), PROPOSED OFFIcAL DRAFT
§ 5 (1969).
27. Id. § 145, comment(e), under "The place where the relationship
between the parties . .. is centered," and fllustration 1 thereunder.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 14:51 (Supp. 1970).
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hours of a motion picture theatre or a store would clearly constitute aggravated arson. Where human life is not directly endangered the offense is simple arson, which is essentially a crime
against the property of another and is graded according to the
amount of damage done. 2 In State v. Bonfanti3 the defendant was
accused of setting fire to an unoccupied building under the circumstances where no other buildings were endangered. In seeking to
sustain a charge of aggravated arson, the state argued that it was
foreseeable that city firemen would come to put out the fire and
that their lives would be endangered. 4 The intended scope and
application of the aggravated arson article was summarized by
Justice Hamiter's statement that "the legislature did not intend
to so enlarge the scope of preexisting legislation as to include
anticipation of injury to firemen or to others who might come
to the site of the fire after its commencement. Rather, we think
that it was intended to include the burning or blowing up of
property when the actor foresees or anticipates the then presence
of persons at the site, or in such close proximity thereto, that
their lives might be endangered by the act."
To have stretched the aggravated arson crime to cover any
case where firemen may foreseeably come to the scene of the
arson to put out the fire, would have virtually meant that every
arson committed in an area where there was fire protection
would become aggravated arson, and would have so limited
simple arson as to render that offense largely ineffective. This
practical consideration was advanced by Justice Hamiter as a
"very compelling reason" for rejecting such a broad application
of aggravated arson. It is one thing to provide severe punishments where there is foreseeable danger to persons in or near
the structure burned or dynamited. It would have been quite
another thing to extend aggravated arson to all city arsons
because of the foreseeable fact that firemen will be called to
fight the fire. Fortunately, the supreme court has kept the scope
of the offense within its proper limits.
Receiving Stolen Things
The offense of receiving stolen things6 covers "the intentional
2. LA. R.S. 14:52 (1950).
3. 254 La. 877, 227 So.2d 916 (1969)
quashed).

4. Id. at 880, 227 So.2d at 917.
5. Id. at 882, 227 So.2d at 918.
6. LA. R.S. 14:69 (1950).

(indictment for aggravated arson
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procuring, receiving, or concealing" of stolen property. (Emphasis supplied.) In State v. Crum7 the defendants had taken
an automobile stolen in Mississippi into the populous city of
New Orleans, where the car was used in the perpetration of a
robbery. Since the stolen car had been obtained in Mississippi,
the Louisiana conviction of receiving stolen things could only
be upheld if there had been a "concealing" of the car in New
Orleans. In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana distinguished its former decision in State v. Ellerbe,8
where it had held that the mere possession in one parish of
pigs stolen in another parish did not constitute "concealing"
within the meaning of the article. In Ellerbe the court had found
that the facts were insufficient to show "that appellant hid the pigs
from public view or that he otherwise did anything to hinder
the owner in his search and investigation of their whereabouts."
(Emphasis supplied.) 9
"A determination of whether stolen property is concealed
depends," according to Justice Barham's opinion in Crum, "upon
the facts of the particular case as they affect the ability of
the owner to search for and find it," and includes conduct
"which may prevent or hinder its discovery by the owner."
Applying this formula to the case at bar, Justice Barham concluded that "[t]he commingling of a stolen automobile with other
vehicles on the public thoroughfares of a city foreign to and
removed from the owner is an effective hinderance to the owner's
discovery of it."1O The fact that the car had been removed to
a populous city some distance from the owner's residence was
of apparent significance. Although the line between Ellerbe and
Crum may be difficult to pinpoint in some future cases, such
difficulty does not detract from the basic soundness of Justice
Barham's decision. In this regard it is well to remember Chief
Justice Fournet's admonition in State v. Smith1 1 where, in upholding the public bribery article of the Criminal Code,12 he
stated that "'if the general class of offenses to which the statute is
directed is plainly within its terms, the statute will not be struck
down as vague, even though marginal cases could be put where
doubts might arise.' "18 The same reasoning is applicable to su7. 255 La. 60, 229 So.2d 700 (1969).
8. 217 La. 639, 47 So.2d 30 (1950).
9. Id. at 643, 47 So.2d at 31.
10. 255 La. 60, 62, 229 So.2d 700, 701 (1969).
11. 252 La. 636, 212 So.2d 410 (1968).
12. LA. R.S. 14:118 (1950).
13. 252 La. 636, 646, 212 So.2d 410, 414 (1968).
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preme court decisions like Crum, which further establish the
appropriate meaning and scope of a phrase or word (such as
"concealed") in a statute.
EXPROPRIATION
Melvin G. Dakin*
Authority to Expropriate
The recent litigation before the First Circuit in Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Houma1 will probably stand for
some time as an example of unparalleled brashness on the part
of a private utility in its relations with a municipally owned
utility. Tiring of its role as supplier of standby capacity to the
municipality as the latter took on additional customers outside
of its municipal limits, the private utility sought to expropriate
the municipal property outside such limits. There is of course
unquestioned statutory power to expropriate private property
for the public use of developing and transmitting electricity for
power and other uses. The general expropriation statute does
not, however, speak to the question of power to expropriate
property already devoted to a public use.2 While the statute
conferring expropriation power on the highway department was
explicit in vesting power to expropriate public as well as private
property,8 in the statute at hand there is no such explicitness;
it is consequently necessary to explore whether the Louisiana
courts have developed a doctrine of expropriation power vested
by necessary implication. The First Circuit turned to common
law authorities for guidance and concluded that there could be
no such implied authority save that arising from a necessity
so absolute that without it the grant itself would be defeated
or rendered meaningless; if applicable, however, the doctrine
would apply whether or not the new use be the same or different
from the present use.4 The court's research also indicated that
the rule that power to expropriate property already in public
use must be express or implied by necessity was subject to an
exception termed a "greater public interest" rule, providing that
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. 229 So.2d 202 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, Dec. 11, 1969,
rehearing denied, Dec. 22, 1969.
2. LA. R.S. 19:2(9) (1950).
3. IA. R.S. 48:303 (1950).
4. 229 So.2d 202, 207-08 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).

